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Abstract
We consider an optimal trading problem over a finite period of time during which an in-
vestor has access to both a standard exchange and a dark pool. We take the exchange to
be an order-driven market and propose a continuous-time setup for the best bid price and
the market spread, both modelled by Lévy processes. Effects on the best bid price arising
from the arrival of limit buy orders at more favourable prices, the incoming market sell
orders potentially walking the book, and deriving from the cancellations of limit sell or-
ders at the best ask price are incorporated in the proposed price dynamics. A permanent
impact that occurs when ‘lit’ pool trades cannot be avoided is built in, and an instanta-
neous impact that models the slippage, to which all lit exchange trades are subject, is also
considered. We assume that the trading price in the dark pool is the mid-price and that
no fees are due for posting orders. We allow for partial trade executions in the dark pool,
and we find the optimal trading strategy in both venues. Since the mid-price is taken from
the exchange, the dynamics of the limit order book also affects the optimal allocation of
shares in the dark pool. We propose a general objective function and we show that, sub-
ject to suitable technical conditions, the value function can be characterised by the unique
continuous viscosity solution to the associated partial integro differential equation. We
present two explicit examples of the price and the spread models, and derive the associ-
ated optimal trading strategy numerically. We discuss the various degrees of the agent’s
risk aversion and further show that roundtrips—i.e. posting the remaining inventory in
the dark pool at every point in time—are not necessarily beneficial.
Keywords: Stochastic control, optimal trading strategies, Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equa-
tion, viscosity solutions, limit order book, market impact, dark pools.
1 Introduction
The focus in this paper is put on trading in ‘lit’ and dark pools. We study how an investor’s
optimal trading programme is affected by the availability of a dark pool as an alternative
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venue with its own set rules. Since the trade execution price in the dark pool is related to
the best bid and ask prices in the standard exchange (often referred to as the ‘lit’ pool or ‘lit’
exchange), we propose at the same time novel microstructure models for the price dynamics
in the lit exchange. In this paper we assume the exchange to be an order-driven market and
put forward continuous-time models for the best bid price and for the bid-ask spread. The
mid-price is of course recovered by adding half the spread to the best bid price. We capture
the permanent price impact by market activity in the drift function and in the Poisson random
measures. The spread process is constructed similarly so as to obtain the same structure for the
best ask price when compared to the best bid price process. Optimal trading in LOBs, of which
microstructural features are modelled, is for example also treated in (i) Cartea and Jaimungal
[8] who model the spot price via a hidden Markov chain to capture the switches between
price regimes, (ii) Cartea et al. [10] who model the deviation of mid-price from its long-term
mean via a jump-diffusion process, and (iii) Obizhaeva and Wang [29], and Alfonsi et al. [1]
who propose trading models by taking into account shape functions for the LOB. Research in
optimal execution in an order-driven market has its roots in the papers by Bertsimas and Lo
[3], and Almgren and Chriss [2]. More recent contributions include, e.g., Pemy and Zhang
[31], Pemy et al. [32], Gatheral and Schied [17], Brigo and Di Graziano [4], Moazeni et
al. [28], Cartea et al. [9], and Ishitani and Kato [25]. Cartea and Jaimungal [7] consider a
continuous-time, jump-diffusion mid-price model and explicitly take into account the impact
of the market activity on the mid-price. In the same context, we also mention the works
by Guéant et al. [19] and Guilbaud et Pham [21], who treat optimal liquidation via limit
orders. A dark pool is an alternative trading venue where buy and sell orders are not publicly
displayed so that the participants’ identity is not revealed. Other advantages of trading in a
dark pool include (i) the possibility of submitting large orders without impacting the market
price, and (ii) trading at more favourable conditions—the dark pool trading price lies between
the best bid and the best ask prices quoted in the standard exchange. (For simplicity, we will
assume that the dark pool utilises the standard exchange mid-price.) On the other hand, dark
pools do not guarantee execution of the trade for it is subject to the availability of a trade
counterparty. Dark pools might also reduce market liquidity since large and institutional
investors, in order to protect private information, resort to these alternative trading venues
where orders remain hidden to the general market participants. Most of the research effort
in dark pools has been devoted to the impact of dark pools on market welfare. A game-
theoretic approach has often been used to model the two competing trading venues, so to
find equilibrium prices and optimal strategies of the market players, also including the effect
of private information and adverse selection on trading. This branch of research includes the
early work by Hendershott and Mendelson [22], who extend the Kyle [27] model to capture
the dynamics of the interplay between investors, dark pool and standard exchange, followed
by Degryse et al. [14], Buti et al. [5] and Daniëls et al. [13]. The work by Ye [35] and
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Zhu [37] focus on the effects on price discovery due to the migration of order flows from the
exchanges to the dark pools, when unobservable liquidity is added to the model.
Kratz and Schöneborn [26] consider trading in the dark pool within the classical field
of optimal liquidation. They model the LOB mid-price by an exogenous square-integrable
martingale and regard the dark pool as a complete-or-zero-execution venue where the arrival
of trading counterparties follows a Poisson process. In this context, we also refer to work by
Horst and Naujokat [23], in which the authors find the optimal strategy when trading in an
illiquid market. The agent under consideration seeks to minimise the deviation from a given
target while submitting market orders in the standard exchange and “passive orders” in a dark
pool. The execution of dark-pool orders is modelled via Poisson processes. As we shall see,
we incorporate such a feature in the model presented in Section 3.
The goal in this paper is to find the optimal trading strategy when utilising standard
exchange and the services of a dark pool. Since the smoothness of the value function is
not guaranteed on the whole domain, there are no classical solutions to the optimisation
problem, in general. Therefore we resort to a weaker notion, the viscosity solutions, and we
show that the value function is the unique viscosity solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
partial integro differential equation (HJB PIDE) associated with the optimisation problem.
There is a vast literature on the theory of viscosity solution of HJB equations of which state
variables are driven by general Markov processes. We here refer in particular to Pham [33,
34], and Fleming and Soner [15] for technical details. Our results concerning the exchange
are coherent with the ones obtained by Chevalier et al. [11]. Indeed we find that the optimal
strategy depends on the book’s dynamics. Furthermore, we show that this is also the case in
the presence of a dark pool.
The paper is organised as follows: after the introduction, in Section 2 we discuss the
optimal trading problem and present our LOB model. Then we formulate the optimisation
problem when only standard exchanges are available to an investor. We consider a gener-
alised objective function and derive the HJB PIDE for the control problem. In Section 3, we
introduce the dark pool by modifying the setup presented in the previous section. We propose
an objective function that accounts for trading in the alternative pool and obtain the associ-
ated HJB PIDE. In Section 4, we provide two numerical examples of the optimal strategy and
we focus on the roles played by the parameters of the explicit model. We conclude with Sec-
tion 5 by summarising the contributions offered in this paper. In order for the present work
to be self-contained, we collect the mathematical conditions, the propositions and the related
proofs at the basis of the viscosity property of the value function in the appendix.
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2 Price model and optimal trading in a standard exchange
We take the view of an investor who seeks to liquidate a sizeable amount of shares over
a finite period of time [t, T], where the initial time t lies in the interval [0, T ). As far as
an optimal liquidation strategy is concerned—which in our setup involves the submission of
market sell orders only—it suffices to model the best bid (or the best ask in the case of an
optimal acquisition), since we consider a temporary price impact to account for the slippage
effect. In the short run, the best bid price at time u ∈ [t, T] depends on its initial state sb at
time t and on the cumulated market activity up to time u.
We fix a probability space (Ω,F ,P) equipped with a filtration {Fu}0≤u≤T satisfying the
usual conditions. In what follows, we assume that the task is to liquidate an amount X (t) =
x ∈ [0,X ] ⊂ R+ ∪ 0 of shares and write for the inventory dynamics
dX (u) = −ν (u)du, (2.1)
where the rate of trading ν := {ν (u)}t≤u≤T is the control process of the stochastic optimisation
problem presented in Section 2.1. We model the best bid price process by
dSb (u) = µb

u,Sb(u),ν (u)

du+
2∑
i=1
∫
R
hbi

u,Sb(u−), zi

Γ˜bi
 
du, dzi

, (2.2)
and the spread process by
d∆(u) = µ (u,∆(u),ν (u))du+
2∑
i=1
∫
R
hi

u,∆(u−), yi

Γ˜i
 
du, dyi

+
2∑
i=1
∫
R
h
b,∆
i

u,Sb(u−),∆(u−), zi

Γ˜bi
 
du, dzi

,
(2.3)
with initial values Sb(t) = sb and ∆(t) = ∆. For i = 1,2, Γb
i
 
du, dzi

and Γi
 
du, dyi

are
independent and homogeneous Poisson random measures. Their compensated versions are
defined by Γ˜i
 
du, dyi

= Γi
 
du, dyi

−du×Πi
 
dyi

and by Γ˜b
i
 
du, dzi

= Γb
i
 
du, dzi

−du×
Πbi
 
dzi

, where Πi
 
dyi

and Πbi
 
dzi

are σ-finite Lévy measures on R such that
∫
|zi |≥1
Πbi
 
dzi

< +∞,
∫
|yi |≥1
Πi
 
dyi

< +∞.
We refer to Gihman and Skorohod [18] for a technical account on Poisson random measures.
We say that ν is admissible if (i) it is progressively measurable, (ii) it is such that
E
h∫ T
t
µ (u,∆(u),ν (u)) 2 + µb u,Sb(u),ν (u) 2dui < ∞, and (iii) it belongs to a com-
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pact set V = [0,N] ⊂ [0,∞). The functions µ, µb, hi, h
b
i and h
b,∆
i
can be chosen such that
both the best bid price and the spread are non-negative, and in ways to reproduce market
features. In Equation (2.2) we consider positive jumps which model the incoming limit buy
orders at a more favourable price, and negative jumps to account for cancellations of limit
buy orders and market sell orders which walk the LOB. Explicit examples will be provided
in Section 4. Equation (2.3) models the spread process, of which width is affected by both,
the market activity on the ask side and on the bid side of the book. In particular, when the
best bid price increases, the spread process should decrease by the same amount, assuming
that the ask price remains unchanged. We therefore include the jump processes of the bid
price in the dynamics of the spread process through the functions hb,∆
i
. The activity on the
ask side is accounted for by the functions hi . We further include the trading rate ν (u) in the
drift of the spread process. This is financially justified for ν (u) has an impact on the best bid
price—which decreases—and thus it has an opposite effect on the spread. The best ask price,
Sa(u) = Sb(u) +∆(u), (2.4)
shares the same model structure as the best bid price given that the spread process {∆(u)}
has the form (2.3). Although we view the optimisation problem from the perspective of
liquidating orders, the model proposed via Equations (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3) can be adapted
to the case of optimal acquisition. Last, we define the cash (wealth) process by
dW (u) = µw(u,Sb(u),ν (u))du,
with initial cash W (t) = w. The function µw models the instantaneous gains made by the
investor through selling shares, possibly taking into account the temporary price impact of
trades.
2.1 Optimal control problem and viscosity solution
An investor seeks to liquidate x shares over a finite period of time [t, T]. The goal is to
maximise the total reward, while minimising the unfavourable impact of executed trades on
the best bid price {Sb(u)}. We assume that the investor trades by means of market sell orders
only, and we introduce a stopping time τ,
τ := inf {u≥ t |X (u)≤ 0} ∧ T, (2.5)
that describes the first time the inventory is depleted, should such an event occur be-
fore the terminal date T . For notational simplicity, in this section we introduce the space
O = [0,X ] × R+ × R and let the vector of the state variables be defined by X t, x (u) = 
X t, x(u),S
b
t, sb
(u),Wt,w(u)

∈ O , with initial values x = (x , sb,w) ∈ O . We propose a gen-
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eral objective function of the form
V (t, x )= sup
ν∈V
E
∫ τ
t
e−r(u−t) f

u,X t, x (u),ν (u)

du+ e−r(τ−t)g

X t, x (τ)

, (2.6)
where r ≥ 0 is a discount rate and E[·] is the expectation given the initial state of the system
(t, x ) ∈ [0, T )×O . We interpret the discount factor as the urgency of the agent to liquidate and
enter in possession of the revenues deriving from the sales. That is, even a risk-neutral investor
(γ = 0) may prefer to liquidate faster as a result of his preference for a more immediate
liquidity. The function f : [0, T]×O ×V → R may have several interpretations. For example
it may represent the gains made from the shares sale, or it may be the return obtained by
following a mean-variance investment strategy. The function g : O → R may represent the
terminal reward obtained by a block trade liquidation of the remaining inventory at time T .
However, g may also be a penalty resulting from failing to liquidate the whole inventory by
time T . We let p := (p1, p2, p3) ∈ R
3, and we define the operator H by
H
 
t, x , p

= sup
v∈V
n
f (t, x , v)− vp1 +µ
b

t, sb , v

p2 +µ
w(t, sb , v)p3
o
. (2.7)
Also, for 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and ϕ ∈ PB, where PB is the space of continuous and polinomially-
bounded functions on [0, T]×O , we let the operatorBδ
b
be defined by
Bδb
 
t, x , p2,ϕ

=
2∑
i=1
∫
|zi |≥δ

ϕ

t, x , sb+ hbi

t, sb, zi

,w

−ϕ (t, x )− hbi

t, sb, zi

p2

Πbi
 
dzi

,
(2.8)
and, for ϕ ∈ C 1,1([0, T]×O ), we letB b
δ
be defined by
B bδ
 
t, x ,ϕ

=
2∑
i=1
∫
|zi |≤δ

ϕ

t, x , sb+ hbi

t, sb , zi

,w

−ϕ (t, x )−hbi

t, sb , zi
∂ ϕ
∂ sb
(t, x )

Πbi
 
dzi

.
(2.9)
Furthermore, we define
Bb
 
t, x ,ϕ

=Bδb

t, x ,
∂ ϕ
∂ sb
,ϕ

+B bδ
 
t, x ,ϕ

. (2.10)
Assumption (vi) in the appendix ensures that the integrals in (2.8) and (2.9) are well defined,
and similarly for (2.10). Details on their convergence and uniform boundedness can be found
in, e.g., Pham [33]. Standard arguments from dynamic programming (DP) suggest that the
value function of the optimal control problem (2.6) satisfies the following HJB PIDE:
rV (t, x )−
∂ V
∂ t
(t, x )−H
 
t, x ,DxV

−Bb (t, x ,V ) = 0, (2.11)
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on [0, T ) × O , with terminal condition V (T, x ) = g(x ). Since one cannot guarantee the
smoothness of V (t, x ) on the whole domain, one cannot discuss the solution of the HJB PIDE
in the classical sense. We resort to the weaker notion of viscosity solutions and borrow the
definition from Pham [33].
Definition 2.1. A continuous function V : [0, T ) × O → R is a viscosity subsolution (resp.
supersolution) of the HJB Equation (2.11) if
rφ ( t¯, x¯ )−
∂ φ
∂ t
( t¯, x¯ )−H
 
t¯, x¯ ,Dxφ

−Bb
 
t¯, x¯ ,φ

≤ 0, (2.12)
(resp. ≥ 0), for any φ ∈ C 1,1([0, T]×O )∩ PB such that V (t, x )−φ(t, x ) attains its maximum
(resp. minimum) at ( t¯, x¯ )⊂ [0, T )×O . A continuous function is a viscosity solution if it is both
a viscosity subsolution and a viscosity supersolution.
In the appendix, we provide the characterisation of the value function V by the unique
continuous viscosity solution of (2.11).
The optimal trading strategy by Bertsimas and Lo [3], whereby one liquidates at a constant
rate ν (u) = X (u)/(T − u+ 1), is recovered within this setup as follows: (i) consider profit
maximisation from trading for a risk-neutral investor as the objective function, and (ii) require
the bid price process (2.2) be a (local) martingale. Under such assumptions, the optimal
trading strategy is independent of the LOB dynamics (cfr. Figure 3, left). By contrast, the
solutions to the concrete examples of the liquidation problems treated in the next section
confirm the view—also in agreement with the work by Chevalier et al. [11]—that the book
dynamics is crucial when dealing with optimal execution. Further details can be found in
Section 4 (Figures 2, 3 and 4).
3 Dark pool
We introduce the possibility for the investor to trade in a standard exchange and in a dark pool
at the same time. The investor faces a trade-off between a costly and sure trade execution in
the exchange and the alternative of a more remunerative but uncertain execution in the dark
pool.
We take this opportunity to emphasise the differences between the recent literature—e.g.
Kratz and Schöneborn [26], and Horst and Naujokat [23]—and the present work. Firstly,
we model both the best bid price and the spread process, thus allowing for a more realistic
description of market features, for there is no such thing as a mid-price in the market. Fur-
thermore, by modelling both the bid price and the spread process, we also include the effect
of the sell side of the LOB on the optimal strategy, which is justified since the two sides of the
LOB are known to be highly correlated. We also include a permanent impact by the trades on
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the market prices. We do not require for the price processes to be martingales, as it is well
known that they mean-revert to their long-term value. We further consider the possibility of
partial execution in the dark pool, and we do not restrict the problem to full liquidation by T .
Finally we propose a class of models that can be adapted to (i) market-specific features, e.g.
mean-reversion, seasonality, and intra-day patterns of the price processes, as well as to (ii)
agent-specific preferences of calculating the P&L and/or measuring utility and risk-aversion.
Such generalisations come at a cost and, in particular, we are not in the position to provide
analytical trading strategies. As specified earlier in this paper, we assume that the trades in
the dark pool take place at the mid-price {Sm(u)} given by
Sm(u) := Sb(u) + 1
2
∆(u) . (3.1)
The purpose of this section is to find the optimal trading strategy for each venue at any
time u ∈ [t, T ). We denote the optimal order size in the dark pool by {η(u)}. Thus, the
control process will be given by a vector-valued process ν = {ν (u)}t≤u≤T defined by ν (u) :=
(ν (u),η(u)) ∈ Z , where {ν (u)} is progressively measurable, {η(u)} is predictable and Z :=
V ×N = [0,N]× [0,N]⊂ [0,∞)2 is a compact set. We modify the inventory and the wealth
dynamics since they now also depend on the dark pool activity. Along the lines of Horst and
Naujokat [23] we model the dark-pool execution part by a jump process, but we choose a
compound Poisson process to account for partial execution of the submitted order. We thus
write
dX (u) = −ν (u)du−η(u)dJ(u), (3.2)
for the combined inventory and
dW (u) = µw(u,Sb(u),ν (u))du+ hw(u,Sb(u−),∆(u−),η(u))dJ(u) (3.3)
for the wealth arising from simultaneously trading in the lit and the dark pools. In the above,
J(u) :=
∑N(u)
i=1 z
w
i is a compound Poisson process with intensity λ
w and i.i.d. random vari-
ables zwi supported on [0,1], which model the executed portion of the submitted order. To
simplify the notation, we introduce the space O := [0,X ] × R2+ × R and we define a vec-
tor of state variables X t, x (u) =
 
X t, x(u),S
b
t, sb
(u),∆t,∆(u),Wt,w(u)

∈ O with initial values
x = (x , sb,∆,w) ∈ O . Next we consider a generalised optimisation problem of the form
V (t, x ) = sup
ν∈Z
E
∫ τ
t
e−r(u−t) f1

u,X t, x (u),ν(u)

du+ e−r(τ−t) g1

X t, x (τ)

, (3.4)
where τ is defined by (2.5), and E[·] is the expectation given the initial state of the system
(t, x ∈ [0, T]×O ). The function f1 may play the role of a running gain or penalty criterion.
We include the lit-pool trading rate ν in f1 as it may reflect a penalisation for the information
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leakage to which publicly-displayed orders are subject to. The function g1 is the terminal
reward function which includes the terminal cash and a penalty for the remainder of the
inventory at time τ∧ T . The HJB PIDE for trading simultaneously in the lit and the dark pool
is analogous to the one presented in Section 2.1. We skip the details at this stage, but write
the exact formulation in the appendix for completion and ease of comparison with the one
for trading optimally only in the standard exchange. We further note that one can recover
the setting presented in Section 2.1 by specifying zw
i
≡ 0. We emphasise here that Kratz
and Schöneborn [26] model the dark pool as a complete-or-zero-execution venue, where the
placed order is either fully executed, when a suitable counterparty is found, or it expires
unexecuted. Their optimal strategy in the single-asset case—which consists of placing small
portions of the inventory in the exchange and all the remainder in the dark pool—can be
obtained as a special case of the present model (see Figure 13).
4 Explicit price models and numerical computation of the trading
strategy
In this section we investigate in detail two particular examples of the best bid price and the
spread processes defined by Equations (2.2) and (2.3). In the numerical solutions that follow,
the chosen parameters are for illustrative purposes. An analysis of real data is beyond the
scope of the present work.
4.1 Mean-reverting model
As well-known by practitioners and as also taken into account in much of the current literature
(see e.g. Cartea et al. [10], and Fodra and Pham [16]), the LOB mid-price mean-reverts
quickly to its long-term mean. Thus we choose the following dynamics for the best bid price
and the spread processes:
dSb (u) = κb

S¯− Sb(u)−µbν (u)

du+ dJ b1 (u)− dJ
b
2 (u), (4.1)
d∆(u) = κ∆

∆¯−∆(u)+µ∆ν (u)

du+ dJ∆1 (u)− dJ
∆
2 (u)− dJ
b
1 (u) + dJ
b
2 (u), (4.2)
where, for i = 1,2, J b
i
(u) =
∑N b
i
(u)
j=1 zi, j and J
∆
i
(u) =
∑N∆
i
(u)
j=1 yi, j are compound Poisson pro-
cesses with intensities λb
i
and λ∆
i
, respectively. For j = 1,2, . . . , we let zi, j and yi, j be se-
quences of non-negative i.i.d. random variables with bounded supports Zi and Yi, respectively.
In (4.1) we interpret dJ b1 as the change in the best bid price due to the submission of limit buy
orders at a more favourable price, whereas dJ b2 models the changes due to incoming market
sell orders which walk the book and the effect of cancellations of limit sell orders posted at the
9
best price. The quantities µb and µ∆ model the permanent impact to which both, the best bid
price and the spread in the standard exchange are subject to, after a trade takes place. In Fig-
ure 1, we plot a simulation of the best ask, the mid, and the best bid prices given respectively
by Equations (2.4), (3.1), and (4.1).
Time
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Pr
ice
s
39.6
39.8
40
40.2
40.4
40.6
40.8
Simulation of best bid, best ask and mid prices
Best Ask
Mid Price
Best Bid
Figure 1: Simulation of the best ask, best bid and mid prices for a time frame of 100 seconds. We set λb1 = λ
b
2 =
λ∆1 = λ
∆
2 = 0.5, zi , yi ∼ U[0,0.1], s
b = 40, ∆ = 0.2, ∆¯ = 0.1, S¯ = 40.1, κb = κ∆ = 2× 10−5.
An assumption that is usually made, see e.g. Almgren and Chriss [2], is that the investor will
get the trade orders executed at a price that includes an instantaneous impact commensurate
to the liquidation rate ν (u). This feedback effect is commonly referred to as “temporary
impact”. The temporarily impacted best bid price Sˆb(u) and the wealth process are given by
Sˆb(u) = Sb(u)− βν (u),
dW (u) = ν (u)Sˆb(u)du+η(u)Sm(u−)dJ(u), (4.3)
where Sm(u) is defined by Equation (3.1). Next we consider an investor who wants to op-
timally liquidate his portfolio by placing sell orders in both, the standard market and the
dark pool. The inventory process of the investor is here modelled by (3.2). The maximised
expected return derived by the shares sale is obtained by solving the optimisation problem
V (t, x ) = sup
ν∈Z
E

W (T )+ (Sb(T )−αX (T ))X (T )− γ
∫ τ
t
X 2(u)du

, (4.4)
where τ is defined by (2.5) and γ ∈ R+∪0. In the considered performance criterion, we allow
for a maximisation of the terminal cashW (T ) together with the terminal value of the portfolio
Sb(T )X (T ) and a penalty for a non-zero inventory level at time T given by −αX 2(T ), where
α > 0. The integral term, as in Cartea et al. [6, 7], penalises for the inventory holding over the
whole period in which the strategy is applied. It is shown in the aforementioned papers that
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such a term can also be related to both, the variance of the portfolio value and the ambiguity
aversion to the mid-price-drift. (In such a case, γ represents the risk-aversion parameter.) The
associated HJB PIDE is given by
sup
v∈Z

−γx2+
∂ V
∂ t
(t, x ) + κb

S¯ − sb −µbv
 ∂ V
∂ sb
(t, x ) +κ∆

∆¯−∆+µ∆v
 ∂ V
∂∆
(t, x )
−v
∂ V
∂ x
(t, x ) + v(sb − β v)
∂ V
∂w
(t, x )
+λwE

V

t, x − nzw , sb,∆,w + nzw

sb +
∆
2

−V (t, x )

+λb1E
h
V

t, x , sb + z1,∆− z1,w

−V (t, x )
i
+λb2E
h
V

t, x , sb − z2,∆+ z2,w

−V (t, x )
i
+λ∆1 E
h
V

t, x , sb,∆+ y1,w

−V (t, x )
i
+λ∆2 E
h
V

t, x , sb,∆− y2,w

−V (t, x )
i
= 0,
(4.5)
with terminal condition V
 
T, x , sb,∆,w

= w+(sb−αx)x . We first show the optimal trading
strategy, which we obtain numerically by solving (4.5), when only a standard exchange is
available to the investor. This is achieved by imposing zwi ≡ 0, so to consider a dark pool that
never executes orders (the dark pool is not available to the investor, that is). The following
figures show how the optimal strategy varies depending on whether the mid-price process is
a sub-, super-, or (local) martingale.
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Figure 2: Optimal strategy when the LOB best bid price is a submartingale. We set γ = 0 (risk-neutral investor,
left panel) , γ= 0.01 (risk-averse investor, right panel).
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Figure 3: Optimal strategy when the LOB best bid price is a martingale. We set γ= 0 (risk-neutral investor, left
panel) , γ= 0.01 (risk-averse investor, right panel).
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Figure 4: Optimal strategy when the LOB best bid price is a supermartingale. We set γ= 0 (risk-neutral investor,
left panel) , γ= 0.01 (risk-averse investor, right panel).
In Figure 5, we show the evolution of the inventory, throughout the liquidation period, for
a risk-neutral investor (i.e. γ = 0). We obtain the optimal trading strategy by solving the HJB
PIDE numerically and we plot the case of multiple executions (occurring at τ1 = 30, τ2 = 40
and τ3 = 50, right panel). We emphasise that τ1, τ2 and τ3 are fixed arbitrarily—for the
sake of illustration only—after a complete solution has been found. The dotted line shows
the evolution of the inventory when there is no dark-pool execution over the entire period
(although the dark pool is available to the investor). The dashed line shows the results for
partial execution in the dark pool, while the solid line shows the results when the posted order
in the dark pool is fully executed. We first look at the role played by α.
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Figure 5: Optimal selling strategy displayed as a function of the remaining inventory. We set γ = 0.0001,
λb1 = λ
b
2 = λ
∆
1 = λ
∆
2 = 0.2, zi ,wi ∼ U[0,0.1], s
b = 40, ∆ = 0.1, ∆¯ = 0.1, S¯ = 40, κb = κ∆ = 0.02, β = 1× 10−5,
zw ∼ U[0,1], λw = 0.1, µ∆ = µb = 0.01. Left panel: α = 6. Right panel: α = 0.5.
The parameter α models the terminal penalty for failing to liquidate the whole inventory
by time T . Higher values of α incentivise the agent to increase the selling rate in the standard
exchange and the size of the dark pool posting (left panel). On the contrary, smaller values of
α allow the agent to retain a larger portion of inventory by terminal date T . The important
feature of the resulting strategy is that it may be suboptimal to place all the remaining shares
in the dark pool at every point in time. This is due to the LOB dynamics specified above.
In Figure 6, we show how the strategy changes for a risk-averse investor (γ > 0). A higher
risk aversion (right panel) incentivises the agent to liquidate faster as he is more sensitive to
potential movements of the market price, while a lower degree of risk aversion is reflected in
a slower liquidation (left panel).
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Figure 6: Optimal selling strategy displayed as a function of the remaining inventory. We set α = 2, λb1 = λ
b
2 =
λ∆1 = λ
∆
2 = 0.2, zi ,wi ∼ U[0,0.1], s
b = 40,∆= 0.1, ∆¯ = 0.1, S¯ = 40, κb = κ∆ = 0.02, β = 1×10−5, zw ∼ U[0,1],
λw = 0.1, µ∆ = µb = 0.01. Left panel: γ= 0.01. Right panel: γ= 0.1.
In Figure 7 we show the sensitivity of the strategy with respect to the permanent price
impact. Depending on the market conditions, it may be worth waiting before posting orders
in the standard exchange (when there is a high permanent impact) and hope to be executed
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in the dark pool, while accelerating the lit pool trading is optimal for the case of a more liquid
market (less permanent price impact).
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Figure 7: Optimal selling strategy displayed as a function of the remaining inventory. We set α= 2, γ= 0.0001,
λb1 = λ
b
2 = λ
∆
1 = λ
∆
2 = 0.2, zi ,wi ∼ U[0,0.1], s
b = 40, ∆ = 0.1, ∆¯ = 0.1, S¯ = 40, κb = κ∆ = 0.02, β = 1× 10−5,
zw ∼ U[0,1], λw = 0.1. Left panel: µ∆ = µb = 0.01. Right panel: µ∆ = µb = 0.0001.
Roundtrips in the dark pool are not necessarily beneficial, that is, the agent may not wish
to post all the remaining inventory in the dark pool. We have investigated such a feature
by looking at fixed times τ, but now we plot the whole optimal strategy ν and η (i.e.) as a
function of the bid price and the spread processes. This confirms our intuition that the agent
may at times retain part of the inventory, depending on the market conditions. In Figure 8 we
show the optimal strategy for both the lit and dark pools in the case that λb1 > λ
b
2 , while in
Figure 9 we consider the case where λb1 < λ
b
2. When the price is expected to increase (Figure
8) we notice that both strategies are reduced in size compared to Figure 9. This is coherent
with the intuition that the agent may wish to exploit the opportunity of a price increase by
waiting to liquidate the inventory. We further see that the quantity posted in both venues
increases as we approach the terminal date T . Take, e.g., the left panel in Figure 8. The
bottom surface is the optimal trading rate in the standard exchange at the beginning of the
trading period (t = 0) with 30,000 shares to liquidate. As t increases, the respective surface
lifts up indicating that having less time remaining implies posting higher quantities in the
venue—we assume that the inventory X = 30,000 at each time. The analogous holds for the
right panel, in which we plot the dark pool strategy.
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Figure 8: Optimal lit and dark pool strategies. We set X t = 30,000 for each t , α = 2, γ = 0.0001, λb1 = 0.5,
λb2 = 0.1, λ
∆
1 = λ
∆
2 = 0.2, zi ,wi ∼ U[0,0.1], ∆¯ = 0.1, S¯ = 40, κ
b = κ∆ = 0.02, β = 1 × 10−5, zw ∼ U[0,1],
λw = 0.1, µ∆ = µb = 0.001.
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Figure 9: Optimal lit and dark pool strategies. We set X t = 30,000 for each t , α = 2, γ = 0.0001, λb1 = 0.1,
λb2 = 0.5, λ
∆
1 = λ
∆
2 = 0.2, zi ,wi ∼ U[0,0.1], ∆¯ = 0.1, S¯ = 40, κ
b = κ∆ = 0.02, β = 1 × 10−5, zw ∼ U[0,1],
λw = 0.1, µ∆ = µb = 0.001.
4.2 Geometric Lévy model
We propose next an exponential model for the best bid price and the spread process, so to
ensure their positivity at every point in time, while upholding all other assumptions made in
Section 4.1. In particular, we set
dSb (u)
Sb(u−)
= −µbν (u)du+ dJ b1 (u)− dJ
b
2 (u), (4.6)
d∆(u)
∆(u−)
= +µ∆ν (u)du+ dJ∆1 (u)− dJ
∆
2 (u)− dJ
b
1 (u) + dJ
b
2 (u). (4.7)
Here, µb and µ∆ are the coefficients of the permanent price impact caused by the lit pool
orders submitted by the agent. All other quantities are defined as in the previous example. In
Figure 10, we plot a simulation of the best ask, the mid and the best bid prices.
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Figure 10: Simulation of the best ask, best bid and mid prices for a time frame of 100 seconds. We set
λb1 = λ
b
2 = λ
∆
1 = λ
∆
2 = 0.5, zi , yi ∼ U[0,0.1], s
b = 40, ∆= 0.2.
By considering the same problem treated in Section 4.1, Equation (4.4), the associated
HJB PIDE is given by
sup
v∈Z

−γx2+
∂ V
∂ t
(t, x )−µbvsb
∂ V
∂ sb
(t, x ) +µ∆v∆
∂ V
∂∆
(t, x ) + v(sb − β v)
∂ V
∂w
(t, x )
−v
∂ V
∂ x
(t, x ) +λwE

V

t, x − nzw, sb,∆,w + nzw

sb +
∆
2

−V (t, x )

+λb1E
h
V

t, x , sb(1+ z1),∆(1− z1),w

−V (t, x )
i
+λb2E
h
V

t, x , sb(1− z2),∆(1+ z2),w

−V (t, x )
i
+λ∆1 E
h
V

t, x , sb,∆(1+ y1),w

−V (t, x )
i
+λ∆2 E
h
V

t, x , sb,∆(1− y2),w

−V (t, x )
i
= 0
with terminal condition V
 
T, x , sb,∆,w

= w+(sb−αx)x . In Figure 11 we show the inventory
evolution for the case of a risk-neutral and of a risk-averse investor (top panels). Furthermore,
we show the optimal trading trajectories for an increasing and a decreasing bid price (bottom
panels). We notice that an increasing bid price (i.e. λb1 > λ
b
2) causes the agent to decelerate
trading in the standard exchange so to benefit from the future favourable market trend. The
opposite holds for a decreasing bid price. As in Section 4.1, we show the lit and dark pools
full trading strategies as a function of the best bid price and the spread. In Figure 12 we show
both, the case of an increasing bid price (top panels) and the case of a decreasing bid price
(bottom panels).
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Figure 11: Optimal selling strategy displayed as a function of the remaining inventory. We set zi , yi ∼ U[0,0.1],
sb = 40, ∆= 0.3, µb = 0µ∆ = 0.0001, β = 1× 10−5, α = 2, zw ∼ U[0,1], λw = 0.1. Top panels: λb1 = λ
b
2 = λ
∆
1 =
λ∆2 = 0.3 and γ = 0 (left), γ = 0.01 (right). Bottom panels: γ= 0.0001 and λ
b
1 = λ
∆
2 = 0.5, λ
b
2 = λ
∆
1 = 0.1 (left),
λb1 = λ
∆
2 = 0.1, λ
b
2 = λ
∆
1 = 0.5.
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Figure 12: Optimal lit and dark pool strategies. We set X t = 30,000 for each t , α = 2, γ = 0.0001, λb1 = 0.1,
λb2 = 0.5, λ
∆
1 = λ
∆
2 = 0.2, zi ,wi ∼ U[0,0.1], β = 1× 10
−5, zw ∼ U[0,1], λw = 0.1, µ∆ = µb = 0.001. Top panels:
λb1 = λ
∆
2 = 0.5, λ
b
2 = λ
∆
1 = 0.1. Bottom panels: λ
b
1 = λ
∆
2 = 0.1, λ
b
2 = λ
∆
1 = 0.5.
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For Figures 11 and 12 similar considerations as for the mean-reverting model apply. The
Kratz and Schöneborn [26] optimal trading strategy in the single-asset case, can be recovered
in the present framework by
(a) modelling {Sb(u)} by a (local) martingale,
(b) setting ∆(u)≡ 0 ∀ u ∈ [t, T],
(c) and setting the random variables zw
i
≡ 1 so to avoid partial execution.
In Figure 13, we provide the results for the above choices in the case of a risk-neutral investor,
γ = 0, (left picture) and of a risk-averse investor, γ > 0, (right picture). The shape of the
policy shares the same features of the results obtained by Kratz and Schöneborn [26] (see
Figure 4.1, page 17) without the constraint that total liquidation has to be achieved by T .
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Figure 13: Optimal selling strategy displayed as a function of the remaining inventory. We set λb1 = λ
b
2 = λ
∆
1 =
λ∆2 = 0.2, zi , yi ∼ U[0,0.1], s
b = 40, ∆ ≡ 0, κb = µb = 0, β = α = 1× 10−5. Left panel γ = 0, and right panel
γ= 0.01.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we consider an optimal trading problem in the situation where an investor has
access to both, a standard exchange and a dark pool. We propose novel continuous-time
dynamics for the best bid price and the market spread, thus obtaining the mid-price, in an
order-driven market, and capture the impact of the market activity in the Poisson random
measures. In particular we show how the best bid price changes due to the submission of
limit buy orders at a more advantageous price, to the incoming market sell orders which
may walk the book, or due to cancellations of limit sell orders posted at the best bid price.
The orders in the dark pool are executed at the current mid-price in line with the available
liquidity. We consider a partial execution setting so to account for various liquidity levels in
the dark pool. We observe that the LOB dynamics plays an important role in determining
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the optimal trading strategy, for both the lit ad the dark pool. This is expected, for the price
traded in the dark pool is taken from the lit pool. In fact, the mid-price is influenced by the
LOB dynamics, and so must be the optimal orders placement in the dark pool. We obtain the
optimal trading strategies first in the case that only a standard exchange is available, and then
also for when one may trade simultaneously in a dark pool. We discuss in detail the cases in
which the market price dynamics is modelled by (i) a mean-reverting jump process and (ii) a
geometric Lévy process, and pay particular attention to properties usually less emphasised in
the literature, e.g. price dynamics which model realistic market features, the permanent price
impact in simultaneous lit and dark pool trading strategies, and the effect of the sell side of the
book in a liquidation problem. We employ the dynamic programming approach to obtain the
optimal trading policies and we characterise—by means of standard arguments—the value
function by the unique viscosity solution of the HJB PIDE associated to the optimal control
problem. Although we treat a more general problem in Section 3, the considered models in
Section 4 are closer to the classical optimal liquidation settings, making comparisons between
the models more informative. The detailed model examples are also utilised to show that so-
called round-trips, whereby an agent decides to post all the remaining inventory in the dark
pool, are not generally beneficial. The discussion extends to the behaviour of market agents
who have various levels of risk-appetite and who will find different strategies of simultaneous
trading in lit and dark pools more attractive.
6 Appendix
6.1 Dark pool optimal control problem
We give the details of the optimal control problem treated in Section 3. For p ∈ R4 with
components (p1, p2, p3, p4), we define the operators H1,Bb,∆ andB∆ by
H1
 
t, x , p

= sup
v∈V

f1 (t, x , v)− vp1 +µ
b

t, sb , v

p2 +µ
w(t, sb , v)p3+µ (t,∆, v) p4

,
Bb,∆
 
t, x ,ϕ

=
2∑
i=1
∫
R

ϕ
 
t, x , sb + hbi
 
t, sb , zi

,∆+ hb,∆
i
 
t, sb ,∆, zi

, y

−ϕ
 
t, x

−hbi
 
t, sb , zi
 ∂ ϕ
∂ sb
 
t, x

− h
b,∆
i
 
t, sb ,∆, zi
 ∂ ϕ
∂∆
 
t, x

Πbi
 
dzi

,
(6.1)
and
B∆
 
t, x ,ϕ

=
2∑
i=1
∫
R

ϕ
 
t, x , sb,∆+ hi
 
t,∆, yi

,w

−ϕ
 
t, x

−hi
 
t,∆, yi
 ∂ ϕ
∂∆
 
t, x

Πi
 
dyi

.
(6.2)
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We also define the operator Bw by
Bw(t, x ,ϕ) = sup
n∈N
λwE
h
ϕ(t, x − nzw , sb,∆,w + hw(t, sb,∆,n) zw)−ϕ(t, x )
i
. (6.3)
Standard dynamic programming arguments suggest that the HJB equation associated to the
optimisation problem in (3.4) is a PIDE of the form
rV (t, x )−
∂ V
∂ t
(t, x )−H1
 
t, x ,DxV

−Bb,∆(t, x ,V )−B∆(t, x ,V )−Bw(t, x ,V ) = 0,
(6.4)
on [0, T )×O , with terminal condition V (T, x ) = g1(x ).
Definition 6.1. A continuous function V : [0, T ) × O → R is a viscosity subsolution (resp.
supersolution) of the HJB Equation (6.4) if
rφ (t¯ , x¯ )−
∂ φ
∂ t
( t¯, x¯ )−H1
 
t¯, x¯ ,Dxφ

−Bb,∆( t¯, x¯ ,φ)−B∆( t¯, x¯ ,φ)−Bw( t¯, x¯ ,φ) ≤ 0
(resp. ≥ 0) for each φ ∈ C 1,1([0, T )×O )∩ PB such that V (t, x )−φ(t, x ) attains its maximum
(resp. minimum) at ( t¯, x¯ )⊂ [0, T )×O . A continuous function is a viscosity solution if it is both
a viscosity subsolution and a viscosity supersolution.
6.2 Assumptions
We next provide technical assumptions underlying the models for the price (2.2), the spread
(2.3) and cash account (3.3) models, and we also state the assumptions for the running gains
and terminal rewards in the value functions presented in Sections 2 and Appendix 6.1.
For C ,M > 0, i = 1,2 and functions ρ1,2 : R→ R
+; such that
∫
R
ρ21
 
yi

Πi
 
dyi

< M ,
∫
R
ρ22
 
zi

Πbi
 
dzi

< M , (6.5)
we assume that1
(i) µ : [0, T]×R+×V → R satisfies the Lipschitz continuity and the linear growth conditions
µ t1,∆1, v−µ t2,∆2, v ≤ C |t1 − t2|+ ∆1−∆2 ,µb  t1,∆1, v ≤ C 1+ ∆1 , (6.6)
for all t1, t2 ∈ [0, T], ∆1, ∆2 ∈ R+ and v ∈ V ;
1We denote the Lp-norm by ‖ · ‖p
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(ii) µb : [0, T]×R+×V → R satisfies the Lipschitz continuity and the linear growth condi-
tions
µb t1, sb1 , v−µb t2, sb2 , v  ≤ C |t1 − t2|+ sb1 − sb2  ,µb t1, sb1 , v  ≤ C 1+ sb1  , (6.7)
for all t1, t2 ∈ [0, T], s
b
1 , s
b
2 ∈ R+ and v ∈ V ;
(iii) µw : [0, T]×R+×V → R satisfies the Lipschitz continuity and the linear growth condi-
tions
µw t1, sb1 , v−µw t2, sb2 , v  ≤ C |t1 − t2|+ sb1 − sb2  ,µw t1, sb1 , v  ≤ C 1+ sb1  , (6.8)
for all t1, t2 ∈ [0, T], s
b
1 , s
b
2 ∈ R+ and v ∈ V ;
(iv) for hb,∆
i
: [0, T]×R+ ×R+ ×R→ R is uniformly bounded for |yi| < 1 and satisfies the
Lipschitz continuity and the linear growth conditions
hb,∆
i

t1, s
b
1 ,∆1, yi

− h
b,∆
i

t2, s
b
2 ,∆2, yi
  ≤ ρ1  yit1 − t2+ sb1 − sb2 + ∆1−∆2 ,hb,∆
i

t1, s
b
1 ,∆1, yi
  ≤ ρ1  yi1+ sb1 + t1+ ∆1 ,
(6.9)
for all t1, t2 ∈ [0, T], s
b
1 , s
b
2 ∈ R+ and ∆1, ∆2 ∈ R+.
(v) for hi : [0, T]×R+×R→ R is uniformly bounded for |yi| < 1 and satisfies the Lipschitz
continuity and the linear growth conditions
hi  t1,∆1, yi− hi  t2,∆2, yi ≤ ρ1  yit1 − t2+ ∆1−∆2 ,hi  t1,∆1, yi ≤ ρ1  yi1+ t1+ ∆1 , (6.10)
for all t1, t2 ∈ [0, T] and ∆1, ∆2 ∈ R+.
(vi) for hb
i
: [0, T]×R+×R→ R is uniformly bounded for |zi| < 1 and satisfies the Lipschitz
continuity and the linear growth conditions
hbi t1, sb1 , zi− hbi t2, sb2 , zi  ≤ ρ2  zit1 − t2+ sb1 − sb2  ,hbi t1, sb1 , zi  ≤ ρ2  zi1+ t1+ sb1  , (6.11)
for all t1, t2 ∈ [0, T] and s
b
1 , s
b
2 ∈ R+.
(vii) for hw : [0, T]× R2+ ×N → R satisfies the Lipschitz continuity and the linear growth
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conditions
hw t1, sb1 ,∆1,n− hw t2, sb2 ,∆2,n ≤ C t1 − t2+ sb1 − sb2 + ∆1 −∆2 ,hw t1, sb1 ,∆1,n ≤ C 1+ t1+ sb1 + ∆1 , (6.12)
for all t1, t2 ∈ [0, T], n ∈ N and s
b
1 , s
b
2 , ∆1, ∆2 ∈ R+.
(viii) the map f : [0, T]×O ×V → R satisfies the Lipschitz continuity and the linear growth
conditions
 f  t1, x 1, v− f  t2, x 2, v ≤ C  |t1 − t2|+ ‖x 1 − x 2‖1 , f  t1, x 1, v ≤ C  1+ ‖x 1‖1 , (6.13)
for all t1, t2 ∈ [0, T], x 1, x 2 ∈ O and v ∈ V ;
(ix) g : O → R satisfies the Lipschitz continuity
g  x 1− g  x 2  ≤ C‖x 1 − x 2‖1, (6.14)
for all x 1, x2 ∈ O ;
(x) the map f1 : [0, T]×O ×V → R satisfies the Lipschitz continuity and the linear growth
conditions
 f1  t1, x 1, v− f1  t2, x 2, v  ≤ C  |t1 − t2|+ ‖x 1 − x 2‖1 , f1  t1, x 1, v  ≤ C  1+ ‖x 1‖1 , (6.15)
for all t1, t2 ∈ [0, T], x 1, x 2 ∈ O and v ∈ V ;
(xi) g1 : O → R satisfies the Lipschitz continuity
g1  x 1− g1  x 2  ≤ C‖x 1 − x 2‖1, (6.16)
for all x 1, x2 ∈ O ;
Standard results—see, e.g., Ikeda and Watanabe [24]—ensure that under the assumptions (i)
to (vii) there exists a strong and path-wise unique solution of the price, the spread and the
wealth models defined by Equations (2.2), (2.3) and (3.3).
6.3 Moments Estimates
We now provide some moments estimates of Sb(u). We note that both, the following proposi-
tion and its proof, are analogous for ∆(u), X (u) and W (u).
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Proposition 6.2. Fix p = 1,2. Let the assumptions (ii) and (vi) hold and let Sb
t, sb
(u) be the
random variable at a fixed time u ∈ [t, T] with initial values (t, sb) ∈ [0, T]×R+. Then, for any
v ∈ V and for any stopping time τ0 ≤ h ∈ [0, T] there exists a constant K = K(p,C ,M , T ) > 0
such that
E
hSb
t, sb
(τ0)
pi ≤ K 1+  sb p ,
E
Sb
t, sb1
(τ0)− S
b
t, sb2
(τ0)
p≤ K   sb1 − sb2 p ,
E
hSb
t, sb
(τ0)− s
b
pi ≤ K 1+  sb p (h− t) p2 ,
E

sup
0≤u≤h
Sb
t, sb
(u)− sb
p ≤ K 1+  sb p (h− t) p2 .
(6.17)
Proof. We adapt the proof in Pham [33] to the present work and indeed we shall consider
the proof only for p = 2 as it suffices to ensure the relation for p = 1, according to Hölder’s
inequality. In order to reduce notation, here K is a generic positive constant which may take
different values in different places. Define Th as the set of all stopping times smaller than
h ∈ [0, T]. By the optional sampling theorem and the Lévy-Itô isometry, we have
E
hSb
t, sb
(τ0)
2i≤
KE

 sb 2+
∫ τ0
t
µbu,Sb
t, sb
(u), v(u)
2 du+ 2∑
i=1
∫ τ0
t1
∫
R
hbi

u,Sb
t, sb
(u), zi
2Πbi  dzidu

,
for τ0 ∈ Th. By the linear growth conditions on µ
b, hb1, h
b
2, we have
E
h Sb
t, sb
(τ0)
2i ≤ K

1+
 sb 2 +E
∫ τ0
t
Sb
t, sb
(u)
2du

. (6.18)
As noted in Pham (1998), if τ0 were a deterministic time, (6.18) would yield
E
h Sb
t, sb
(τ0)
2i ≤ K h1+  sb 2i .
By definition of Th, we note that
E
∫ τ0
t
Sb
t, sb
(u)
2du

≤ E

∫ h
t
Sb
t, sb
(u)
2du

 .
Thus, by applying Fubini’s theorem to exchange the order of integration and by Gronwall’s
23
lemma,
E
h Sb
t, sb
(τ0)
2i ≤ K

1+  sb 2 +
∫ h
t
E
h Sb
t, sb
(u)
2idu

 ≤ K h1+  sb 2i , (6.19)
for a suitable constant K = K(p,C ,M , T ). Define the process Z(u) by
Z(u) = Sb
t, sb1
(u)− Sb
t, sb2
(u).
Then by an application of Itoˆ’s formula to |Z(u)|2, we have
E
hZ(τ0)2i = E
sb1 − sb2 2+
∫ τ0
t
2Z(u)

µb

u,Sb
t, sb1
(u), v(u)

−µb

u,Sb
t, sb2
(u), v(u)

du
+
2∑
i=1
∫ τ0
t
∫
R
hbi

u,Sb
t, sb1
(u), zi

−hbi

u,Sb
t, sb2
(u), zi
2Πbi  dzidu

 .
From the Lipschitz condition on µb, hb1 and h
b
2, it follows that
E
h  Z(τ0) 2i≤KE
 sb1 − sb2 2+
∫ τ0
t
Sb
t, sb1
(u)− Sb
t, sb2
(u)
2du

.
By making use of Fubini’s Theorem and Gronwall’s Lemma we get
E
Sb
t, sb1
(τ0)− S
b
t, sb2
(τ0)
2≤KE

 sb1 − sb2 2+
∫ h
t
Z(u)2du

≤ K  sb1 − sb2 2,
for a suitable constant K = K(p,C ,M , T ). For the third moment estimate, we make use of the
first moment estimate in (6.17) to obtain
E
hSb
t, sb
(t)− sb
2i ≤ K
∫ τ0
t

1+E
h Sb
t, sb
(u)
2idu

≤ K

1+
 sb 2 (h− t).
The fourth moment estimate in (6.17) follows from the third moment estimate, Doob’s maxi-
mal inequality, and the fact that the constant K does not depend on the control process. 
6.4 Viscosity Solution
In what follows, we note that it suffices to show the viscosity property for the model presented
in Section 3, since the model discussed in Section 2.1 is a special case.
Proposition 6.3. The value function V : [0, T] × O → R defined in (3.4) is continuous on
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[0, T]×O . Furthermore, for K > 0 and ∀ x ∈ O , it satisfies
V (t, x )≤ K
 
1+ ‖x‖1

. (6.20)
Proof. We proceed in two steps. We first show that the value function is Lipschitz continuous
in x , uniformly in t. Next we show that it is continuous in t. We take x , y ∈ O and since
| sup(A)− sup(B)| ≤ sup |(A− B)|, we have that
|V (t, x )− V
 
t, y

| =
 supν∈Z E
∫ τ
t
e−r(u−t) f1

u,X t, x (u),ν(u)

du+ e−r(τ−t)g1

X t, x (τ)

− sup
ν∈Z
E
∫ τ
t
e−r(u−t) f1

u,X t, y(u),ν(u)

du+ e−r(τ−t)g1

X t, y(τ)

≤ sup
ν∈Z
E
∫ τ
t
e−r(u−t)

f1

u,X t, x (u),ν(u)

du− f1

u,X t, y(u),ν(u)

du
+ e−r(τ−t)

g1

X t, x (τ)

− g1

X t, y(τ)
.
The Lipschitz continuity of f1 and g1 give
|V (t, x )−V
 
t, y

|
≤ sup
ν∈Z
E
∫ τ
t
e−r(u−t)K |X t, x (u)− X t, y(u)|du+ e
−r(τ−t)K |X t, x (τ)− X t, y(τ)|

≤ K ||x − y||1,
where the last inequality is justified by the moments estimates in Proposition 6.2. We note
that an analogous calculation will produce Equation (6.20). We now take 0 ≤ t1 < t2 < T
and we apply the DP to obtain
|V
 
t1, x

− V
 
t2, x

| =
 sup
ν∈Z
E
∫ t2∧τ
t1
e−r(u−t1) f1

u,X t1, x (u),ν(u)

du
+ e−r(t2−t1)V

t2,X t1, x (t2)

1{τ≥t2}
+ e−r(τ−t1)g1

X t1, x (τ)

1{τ<t2}

− V
 
t2, x
.
We can add and subtract the quantity
1{τ<t2}
e−r(τ−t1)(g1(x )+ V (t2, x )) + 1{τ≥t2}e
−r(t2−t1)V (t2, x ),
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to obtain
|V
 
t1, x

− V
 
t2, x

| ≤
sup
ν∈Z
E
∫ t2∧τ
t1
e−r(u−t1)| f1

u,X t1, x (u),ν(u)

|du+ 1{τ≥t2}e
−r(t2−t1)|V

t2,X t1, x (t2)

− V (t2, x )|
+ 1{τ<t2}e
−r(τ−t1)|g1

X t1, x (τ)

− g1(x )|+ 1{τ<t2}e
−r(τ−t1)|g1(x )− V (t2, x )|
+ 1{τ<t2}|(e
−r(τ−t1)− 1)V
 
t2, x

|+ 1{τ≥t2}|(e
−r(t2−t1) − 1)V
 
t2, x

|

≤ K |t2 − t1|(1+ |x |),
where the last inequality is justified by: (i) the linear growth of f1, g1 and V , the Lipschitz
continuity of g1 and of V in x uniformly in t, and the moment estimates in Proposition 6.2.
Thus, we can conclude that
|V
 
t1, x

− V
 
t2, y

| ≤ K(|t2 − t1|(1+ |x |)+ ||x − y ||).

Proposition 6.4. The value function V defined by Equation (3.4) is a viscosity solution of the
HJB PIDE (6.4).
Proof. We show that V (t, x ) is a continuous viscosity solution of (6.4) by proving that it is both
a supersolution and a subsolution. We proceed along the same lines of Øksendal and Sulem
[30] and we first show the supersolution property. We define a test functionφ : [0, T )×O → R
such that φ ∈ C 1,1([0, T )× O ) ∩ PB and, without loss of generality, we assume that V − φ
reaches its minimum at ( t¯, x¯ ), such that
V (t¯, x¯ )−φ (t¯ , x¯ ) = 0. (6.21)
We let τ1 be a stopping time defined by τ1 = inf {u > t¯ |X t¯, x¯ (u) /∈ Bε(x¯ )}, where Bε(x¯ ) is
the ball of radius ε centred in x¯ . Then we define the stopping time τ∗ = τ1 ∧ ( t¯ + h) for
0< h< T − t¯ and note that γ¯ := E t¯ x¯ [τ
∗] > 0. From the first part of DP and the definition of
φ, it follows that, for arbitrary ν ∈ Z ,
V ( t¯, x¯ )≥ E

∫ τ∗
t¯
e−r(u− t¯) f1

u,Xν t¯, x¯ (u),ν(u)

du+ e−r(τ
∗− t¯)φ

τ∗,Xν t¯, x¯ (τ
∗)
.
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By applying Dynkin’s formula to e−r(τ
∗− t¯)φ
 
τ∗,Xν t¯, x¯ (τ
∗)

at ( t¯, x¯ ), we get
E
∫ τ∗
t¯

e−r(u− t¯) f1

u,Xν t¯, x¯ (u),ν(u)

− e−r(u− t¯)
¨
rφ

u,Xν t¯, x¯ (u)

−
∂ φ
∂ t

u,Xν t¯, x¯ (u)

−H¯1

u,Xν t¯, x¯ (u),Dxφ,ν(u)

−Bb,∆(u,X
ν
t¯, x¯ (u),φ)−B∆(u,X
ν
t¯, x¯ (u),φ)
−B¯w(u,X
ν
t¯, x¯ (u),φ,η(u))
«
du

≤ 0,
where H¯1 and B¯w are defined respectively by
H¯1
 
t, x , p , v

= −vp1+µ
b

t, sb , v

p2 +µ
w(t, sb , v)p3 +µ (t,∆, v) p4,
and
B¯w(t, x ,ϕ,n) = λ
w
E
h
ϕ(t, x − nzw , sb,∆,w + hw(t, sb ,∆,n)zw)−ϕ(t, x )
i
.
We divide both sides by −γ¯ and let h→ 0, resulting in
rφ ( t¯, x¯ )−
∂ φ
∂ t
( t¯, x¯ )−H¯1
 
t¯, x¯ ,Dxφ, v

− f1( t¯, x¯ , v)−Bb,∆( t¯, x¯ ,φ)−B∆( t¯, x¯ ,φ)
−Bw( t¯, x¯ ,φ,η) ≥ 0.
Due to the arbitrariness of v , we can rewrite the above as
rφ ( t¯, x¯ )−
∂ φ
∂ t
( t¯, x¯ )−H1
 
t¯, x¯ ,Dxφ

−Bb,∆( t¯, x¯ ,φ)−B∆( t¯, x¯ ,φ)−Bw( t¯, x¯ ,φ) ≥ 0,
which proves the supersolution inequality. We now prove the subsolution inequality. We let
φ be a smooth and polinomially-bounded test function such that V −φ has its maximum at
( t¯, x¯ ). Without loss of generality, we assume V ( t¯, x¯ )− φ( t¯ , x¯ ) = 0. We shall show that the
following inequality
rφ ( t¯, x¯ )−
∂ φ
∂ t
( t¯, x¯ )−H1
 
t¯, x¯ ,Dxφ

−Bb,∆( t¯, x¯ ,φ)−B∆( t¯, x¯ ,φ)−Bw( t¯, x¯ ,φ) ≤ 0,
(6.22)
holds. We define τ1 = inf

u > t¯ |
 
u, X t¯, x¯ (u)

/∈ Bε( t¯, x¯ )
	
and we define the stopping time
τ∗ = τ1 ∧ ( t¯ + h). By the second part of the DP, there exist a control ν
∗ ∈ Z such that, for
δ > 0, we have
V
 
t¯, x¯

≤ E

∫ τ∗
t¯
e−r(u− t¯) f1

u,Xν
∗
t¯, x¯ (u),ν
∗(u)

du+ e−r(τ
∗− t¯)φ

τ∗,Xν
∗
t¯, x¯ (τ
∗)
+ δ h¯.
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We divide both sides by −γ¯ and get
−δ ≥
1
γ¯
E
∫ τ∗
t¯
−

e−r(u− t¯) f1

u,Xν
∗
t¯, x¯ (u),ν(u)

− e−r(u− t¯)
¨
rφ

u,Xν
∗
t¯, x¯ (u)

−
∂ φ
∂ t

u,Xν
∗
t¯, x¯ (u)

− H¯1

u,Xν
∗
t¯, x¯ (t),Dxφ,ν(u)

−Bb,∆

u,Xν
∗
t¯, x¯ (u),φ

−B∆

u,Xν
∗
t¯, x¯ (u),φ

−B¯w

u,Xν
∗
t¯, x¯ (u),η
∗(u)φ
«
du

.
For h→ 0 and by the arbitrariness of δ, (6.22) follows. 
Proposition 6.5. Let U (resp. V ) be a viscosity subsolution (resp. supersolution) of (6.4). If
U(T, x )≤ V (T, x ) on O , then U ≤ V on [0, T]×O .
Proof. Let U be a subsolution and V be a supersolution. Since U , V ∈ PB, then there exist a
p > 1 such that
|U(t, x )|+ |V (t, x )|
1+ ‖x‖pp
 <∞, (6.23)
where the operator ‖ · ‖pp is the Lp-norm raised to the p-th power. Let V˜
ε(t, x ) := V (t, x ) +
εκ(t, x ), where ε > 0 and κ(t, x ) = e−ζt
 
1+‖x‖2p2p

, for ζ > 0. Then V˜ ε is a supersolution of
(6.4). Indeed, let φ(t, x ) be the test function for V˜ ε, then the test function for V is φ(t, x )−
εκ(t, x ). First note that, due to assumptions (iv)-(vii) and the fact that Z is a compact set,
we have
rεκ (t, x )−
∂ εκ
∂ t
(t, x )− sup
v∈Z
H¯1
 
t, x ,Dxεκ, v

−Bb,∆(t, x ,εκ)
−B∆(t, x ,εκ)−Bw(t, x ,εκ)≥ 0,
for ζ sufficiently large. By the supersolution property of V , we have
r(φ− εκ) (t, x )−
∂ (φ − εκ)
∂ t
(t, x )−H1
 
t, x ,Dx
 
φ − εκ

−Bb,∆(t, x ,φ − εκ)
−B∆(t, x ,φ − εκ)−Bw(t, x ,φ − εκ)≥ 0,
and recalling that sup(A+ B) ≤ supA+ supB, we have
rφ (t, x )−
∂ φ
∂ t
(t, x )−H1
 
t, x ,Dxφ

−Bb(t, x ,φ)−Bb,∆(t, x ,φ)−Bw(t, x ,φ) ≥
rεκ (t, x )−
∂ εκ
∂ t
(t, x )− sup
v∈Z
H¯1
 
t, x ,Dxεκ, v

−Bb,∆(t, x ,εκ)
−B∆(t, x ,εκ)−Bw(t, x ,εκ)≥ 0.
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Since by (6.23) limx→∞ sup[0,T](U − V˜
ε)(t, x ) = −∞, we can assume w.l.o.g. that
M := max
[0,T]×O
(U (t, x )− V (t, x )) ,
is attained at ( t¯, x¯ ) ∈ [0, T]×Σ, where Σ ⊂ O is a compact set. In order to prove Proposition
6.5, it suffices to show that M < 0. Suppose by contradiction that there exists a ( t¯, x¯ ) ∈
[0, T )×Σ such thatM > 0. For ε > 0, we define the function Ψε by
Ψε
 
t1, t2, x 1, x 2

= U
 
t1, x 1

− V
 
t2, x 2

−ψε
 
t1, t2, x 1, x 2

,
where
ψε
 
t1, t2, x 1, x 2

:=
1
2ε

|t1 − t2|
2+ ‖x 1 − x 2‖
2
2

.
The function Ψε is continuous and admits a maximum point M ε, where M ≤M ε, at m = 
tε1, t
ε
2, x
ε
1, x
ε
2

. That is, the function U(t1, x 1)−ψ
ε(t1, t2, x 1, x 2) has its maximum at m and
V (t2, x 1)− (−ψ
ε(t1, t2, x 1, x 2)) has its minimum at m. Also, formally limε→0
 
tε1, t
ε
2, x
ε
1, x
ε
2

converges, up to a subsequence, to ( t¯, t¯ , x¯ , x¯ ) (see Crandall et al. [12] for details). We let
oε = (t1 − t2)/ε, and define the vector p
ε by
pε =

pε1, p
ε
2, p
ε
3, p
4

=

1
ε
 
xε1 − x
ε
2

,
1
ε
 
s
b,ε
1 − s
b,ε
2

,
1
ε
 
∆ε1 −∆
ε
2

,
1
ε
 
wε1 −w
ε
2

.
We can apply the viscosity subsolution and supersolution properties at the point m to see that,
for δ ∈ [0,1] and for some ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ C
1,1([0, T] × O ) such that U − ϕ1 (V − ϕ2) has its
maximum (minumum) at tε1, x
ε
1 → t¯, x¯
 
tε2, x
ε
2 → t¯, x¯

, we have
rU

tε1, x
ε
1

− oε −H1

tε1, x
ε
1, p
ε

−Bδb,∆

tε1, x
ε
1, p
ε
2,U

−B
b,∆
δ

tε1, x
ε
1,ϕ1

−Bδ∆

tε1, x
ε
1, p
ε
3,U

−B∆δ

tε1, x
ε
1,ϕ1

−Bw

tε1, x
ε
1,U

≤ 0
and
rV

tε2, x
ε
2

− oε −H1

tε2, x
ε
2, p
ε

−Bδ
b,∆

tε2, x
ε
2, p
ε
2,V

−B
b,∆
δ

tε2, x
ε
2,ϕ2

−Bδ∆

tε2, x
ε
2, p
ε
3,V

−B∆δ

tε2, x
ε
2,ϕ2

−Bw

tε2, x
ε
2,V

≥ 0.
We can subtract the two inequalities and take the limit for ε,δ→ 0 to get r [U ( t¯, x¯ )− V ( t¯, x¯ )] ≤
0, which concludes the proof. 
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